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Common-Law Interpretation of Appropriate Education:
The Road Not Taken in Rowley
Mark C. Weber
Thirty years old in 2012, Board of Education v. Rowley1 remains the Supreme
Court’s sole pronouncement on the meaning of the duty to provide appropriate education
for children with disabilities. This duty is the central one imposed on school districts by
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,2 the law that governs special education
services in the public schools of the United States. Rowley is known as the case that
established a some-benefit or floor-of-opportunity standard for the services school
districts must provide to children who have disabilities.3 But the some-benefit approach
is by no means the only one the Court could have adopted. It could have endorsed the
view of the lower courts that each child with a disability must be given the opportunity to
achieve his or her potential commensurate with the opportunity offered other children.4
Or it could have adopted a standard based on achievement of the child’s full potential or
the opportunity to become self-sufficient, or given some other meaning to the statutory
term.
What this Article explores is a different possibility: that the Court not have taken
the case in the first place, or simply decided it on its facts without making any grand
pronouncement about the interpretation of appropriate education. The result would have
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See Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 632 F.2d 945, 948 (2d Cir.
1980), rev’d, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).

been caselaw development of the statutory term’s meaning in line with the evolution of
the meaning of terms in other vaguely worded statutes. Scholars have labeled this a
common-law approach because of its analogy to common-law development of negligence
or other non-statutory legal standards.5 As for appropriate education under IDEA,
competing definitions may have arisen in different courts. Meanings that were never
suggested in Rowley might have come forward. The proportional maximization standard
urged by the lower courts in Rowley might have gained ascendancy—or been rejected
over a run of cases due to problems with workability or other difficulties. Only after a
period of years would an observer be able to look back and see where the path of
development led. Then with or without Supreme Court guidance, a clear meaning for the
statutory term might emerge.
This Article lays out the reasons that a common-law approach would have been
the superior one. Persuasive analogies to other statutes support it; moreover, Rowley’s
reasoning in reaching the some-benefit standard is highly unsatisfactory. Had a commonlaw approach led to proportional maximization, there would have had good justification
for it, but had it led elsewhere, there might have been justification for that, too.
Of course, the Court in Rowley rejected common-law development for the
appropriate education duty, and established some-benefit as the standard. Interestingly,
however, many lower courts have marched along on something that strongly resembles a
common-law road, but that cannot be given that name because of the Supreme Court’s
decision. This Article concludes by pointing to lower court cases that stretch the limits of
the some-benefit standard and may represent the emergence of new approaches, as the
traditional mode of common-law development would allow. Of course, much has been
5

See infra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing common-law approach).
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written about Rowley, most of it critical of the case.6 But the possibility and prospects of
a common-law approach to appropriate education remain undeveloped. The time for the
approach just may have come.
Part I of this Article provides a brief introduction to IDEA and Rowley. Part II
discusses common-law interpretation of statutory provisions and sketches the outlines of
a common-law approach to appropriate education. Part III discusses appropriate
education as proportional maximization of educational opportunity, a meaning of the
term that might have received favor had the courts been given the opportunity for
common-law development. Part IV asks whether congressional ratification of Rowley
has foreclosed judicial approaches to appropriate education other than the one adopted in
that case and concludes that they remain open. Finally, Part V points to caselaw under
IDEA that suggests a more sophisticated understanding of appropriate education than a
narrow reading of Rowley might indicate. It contends that these cases may represent the
beginnings of common-law interpretation of the concept.
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Early articles criticizing Rowley include: Katharine T. Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational
Decisionmaking for the Handicapped Child, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1985, at 7; John E.B. Myers
& William R. Jenson, The Meaning of “Appropriate” Educational Programming Under the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, 1984 S. ILL. U.L.J. 401; Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Board of Education of the
Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 235 (1985); Case
Comment, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 989 (1983); Casenote, 14 ST. MARY’S L.J. 425 (1983). More recent critical
commentary includes: Joyce O. Eckrem & Eliza J. McArthur, Is the Rowley Standard Dead? From Access
to Results, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 199 (2001); Chad Hinson, Note, A Supreme Paradox: Autism
Spectrum Disorder and Rowley Misapplication of a Judicial Relic to an Unprecedented Social Epidemic, 5
FLA. A& M U. L. REV. 87 (2009); Jonathan Stead, Toward True Equality of Educational Opportunity:
Unlocking the Potential of Assistive Technology Through Professional Development, 35 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 224 (2009). Helpful recent studies of Rowley and the caselaw on appropriate
education include: Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley: An
Examination of Its Precedential Impact, 37 J. L. & EDUC. 329 (2008); Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley
Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1
(2009); Scott Goldschmidt, Comment. A New Idea for Special Education Law: Resolving the
“Appropriate” Educational Benefit Circuit Split and Ensuring a Meaningful Education for Students with
Disabilities, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 749 (2011). Of special interest to students of the case is Amy June
Rowley, Rowley Revisited: A Personal Narrative, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 311 (2008 (providing personal narrative
of background and consequences of case).
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I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT AND THE ROWLEY CASE
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires states that receive federal
special education funding to provide a free, appropriate public education to all children
with disabilities.7 Participating states and their local school districts not only must
furnish an appropriate education programs, but also must provide services related to
education, such as transportation, physical and occupational therapy, sign language
interpretation, and school health.8 The law requires that children with disabilities are to
be educated, to the maximum extent appropriate, with children who do not have
disabilities, and that school districts have to afford the children supplementary aids and
services to avoid any need for removal from regular classes.9
Parents of children with disabilities have rights to notice and consent and,
critically, rights to participate in the creation of their child’s individualized education
program (“IEP”). The IEP document sets out the services to be delivered to the child.10
It must contain a statement of the child’s present levels of academic achievement and
functional performance; a statement of measurable annual goals, both functional and
academic; a description of how the child’s progress toward meeting the annual goals will
be measured; a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary
services to be provided to the child or on behalf of the child; an explanation of the extent
of the child’s participation with nondisabled children in regular classes; a statement of

7

See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(i) (2006) (authorizing appropriations).

8

§ 1401(26) (defining “related services”).

9

§ 1412(a)(5).
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See § 1414(d) (requiring opportunity for parental participation in devising individualized
education program).
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accommodations necessary for the child on state and district assessments; and a variety of
other items.11 The parents may challenge the program or placement that the school
district offers by demanding an adversarial “due process hearing” and they or the school
district may appeal the result of the hearing to court.12 The guarantee to each child with a
disability of the right to a free, appropriate education, and the guarantee to parents of
procedural rights were key features of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children
Act;13 they demonstrate a “congressional emphasis” on furnishing individual
participation rights to enforce the law’s underlying obligations.14 Two federal cases that
influenced Congress in its drafting of the law upheld procedural due process claims
against exclusion from public school and equal protection claims against denial of
services to children with disabilities in public schools 15
Parents of children with disabilities spent years courting political allies to secure
passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.16 Although some states and
local school districts had long furnished services to children with disabilities and received
limited federal special education reimbursement, as of 1975 approximately 1.75 million
11

§ 1414(d)(A)(i).

12

§ 1415(f)-(i). States may create a state-level hearing review procedure that must be exhausted
before the matter goes to court. § 1415(g). The child remains in the existing placement during the
pendency of proceedings. § 1415(j). Attorneys’ fees are available to parents if they are successful. §
1415(i)(3)(B)-(F). The law also provides rights to challenge long-term suspensions, expulsions, or other
removals from school imposed on children with disabilities. § 1415(k).
13

Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).

14

See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 476 U.S. 176, 205-206 (1982).

15

Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children
(P.A.R.C.) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The
Supreme Court commented on the importance of these cases to the formation of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act in Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192-93.
16

See ROBERTA WEINER & MAGGIE HUME, . . . AND EDUCATION FOR ALL 14-21 (2d ed. 1987).
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children with disabilities were excluded from public school and 2.5 million were in
programs that did not meet their needs.17 In 1990, Congress renamed the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and that is
the name the law has today.18 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act of 2004 comprises the most recent amendments to the statute.19
In 1982, without waiting for any clear conflict in the circuits to develop, the
Supreme Court took a case that called for it to construe the duty to provide appropriate
education. In Board of Education v. Rowley, the Court interpreted appropriate education
to mean services sufficient to provide “some educational benefit” to child with a
disability.20 The entitlement is to services that are beneficial,21 so that access to
education is meaningful.22 Nevertheless, Congress’s intent was “more to open the door
of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any
particular level of education once inside.”23 Continuing the schoolhouse metaphor, the

17

H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975).

18

Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990). The term “handicapped” has become disfavored,
and many in the disabilities rights movement favor placing the noun “person” or “individual” first and the
“with disabilities” modifier later, in order to emphasize that a person with a disability is a human being
rather than a manifestation of an impairment. See Illinois Attorney General, Disability Rights: Manual of
Style for Depicting People with Disabilities,
http://www.ag.state.il.us/rights/manualstyle.html (visited July 29, 2011).
19

Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482
(West 2008)). See generally Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 27 (2006) (describing and commenting on 2004
Reauthorization).
20

458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982)

21

Id. at 200-01.

22

Id. at 192. There must be “personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the
child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” Id. at 203.
23

Id. at 192.
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Court described the appropriate education obligation as that to provide a “floor of
opportunity” consisting of “access to specialized instruction and related services.”24
The Court applied this some-benefit definition of appropriate education to
overturn a ruling that a first-grader who was deaf but had lipreading skills and a hearing
aid was entitled to a sign language interpreter even though she was achieving satisfactory
grades and passing from grade to grade without the benefit of an interpreter.25 The Court
rejected the standard adopted by the lower courts that a child must be provided services
sufficient to maximize her potential commensurate with the opportunity provided
children without disabilities to maximize theirs.26
II. COMMON-LAW INTERPRETATION OF “APPROPRIATE EDUCATION”
The Court’s precipitate decision to adopt a some-benefit or “floor of opportunity”
standard in Rowley foreclosed the opportunity to develop a common law of appropriate
education. The idea of a common law of appropriate education is hardly radical. Many
statutes employ terms whose meanings are open-ended. By interpreting these statutes to
apply or not apply to a variety of factual situations, courts develop a common law
pertaining to a statute.27 Thus the unadorned phrase “restraint of trade” in the Sherman

24

Id. at 201.

25

Id. at 209-10. The Court said, “We do not attempt to establish a single test for determining the
adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act,” id. at 202, but suggested
that if a child is advancing from grade to grade in regular education classrooms the standard is likely to be
met, id. at 203-04 & n.25.
26

Id. at 198.

27

See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 607 (6th
ed. 2009) (“[T]he fact is that common lawmaking often cannot be sharply distinguished from statutory or
constitutional interpretation. As specific evidence of legislative purpose with respect to the issue at hand
attenuates, all interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking.”); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There
Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between
‘common law’ and ‘statutory interpretation’ is a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind. . . .
The distinction . . . is entirely one of degree.); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of
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Antitrust Act28 requires case-by-case interpretation and precedential evolution that is little
different from common-law development of concepts such as negligence.29
The term “appropriate education” is not readily susceptible to interpretation by
traditional means of statutory construction. Ordinary usage gives little help, nor does
professional terminology from before 1975 give an interpretation. Although special

Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 889-90 (1986) (“I do not differentiate between the creation
of federal common law and the ordinary interpretation of federal enactments, because I do not believe any
such differentiation would have operative effect.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) “‘Federal common law,’ as I use the term, means any
federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text-whether or not
that rule can be described as the product of ‘interpretation’ in either a conventional or an unconventional
sense.”).
28

15 U.S.C. ' 1 (2006). Other statutory areas that have received similar treatment include patents,
see Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 54 (2010) ([A]
significant portion of U.S. patent law, including some of the most important and controversial patent law
doctrines, is either built upon judicial interpretation of elliptical statutory phrases, or is devoid of any
statutory basis whatsoever.”); labor relations and unfair competition in interstate commerce, see Field,
supra note __, at 940 n. 245 (“The Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act serve as clear
examples of federal statutes under which federal judicial lawmaking is appropriate and necessary to define
their terms.”), 980 n.415 (“Federal common law governs unfair competition in or affecting interstate
commerce, for example, under the authority of § 43 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act . . . .”); and
bankruptcy, see Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 4 (2006) (“Federal common lawmaking has long quietly existed
in bankruptcy, but it has been a clunking sort of common lawmaking because it has never been recognized
as such. Instead, it has always been analyzed in terms of equity, which has led to the inappropriate
statutory and historical limitations.”). Of course, courts need not admit that what they are doing is common
lawmaking, though in the Sherman Act context, they have done exactly that. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (describing Rule of Reason as part of “common-law
tradition” under Sherman Act).
29

See FALLON, supra note __, at 621 n.9 (“[W]here a statute adopts open-ended language that
necessitates the exercise of substantial judicial discretion, it is hard to avoid concluding that Congress
delegated implied lawmaking powers.”) (collecting authorities); see also id. at 607 n.1 (pointing out that
some writers consider instances such as Sherman Act interpretation to be federal common lawmaking
whereas others deem them ordinary statutory interpretation); Field, supra note __, at 890 (“I will use
‘federal common law’ to refer to any rule of federal law created by a court . . . when the substance of that
rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments—constitutional or congressional.”); Merrill, supra note
__, at 43 (“[I]f in addition to granting jurisdiction to the federal courts, the enacting body adopts a broad
legal standard that federal courts are directed to apply in resolving controversies, this may well support an
inference of delegation. . . . [T]here is a category of provisions that are so vague and general that further
‘interpretation’ is necessary before the process of application can even begin. In this sort of case, the courts
must develop rules that translate the general textual language into applicable law.”). Of course, Congress
may always step in and adopt an interpretation contrary to one that courts have created. See Westen &
Lehman, supra note __, at 326-27 (“[W]hile the federal judiciary and the national executive inevitably
make law in performing their respective functions, the nonconstitutional law they make is subordinate to
Congress’s final legislative authority.”).
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educators used the words “appropriate education” before passage of the Act, there
appears to have been no clear or uniform meaning given to the term when they did so.30
The strained nature of Justice Rehnquist’s effort in Rowley to define the term
appropriate education as that which provides some educational benefit further
demonstrates that the phrase is not readily susceptible to traditional modes of
interpretation. The opinion conceded that the language providing a definition of “free,
appropriate public education” in the Act “tends towards the cryptic rather than the
comprehensive,”31 and that “[n]oticeably absent from the language of the statute is any
substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped
children”32 Nevertheless, the Court rested its some-benefit interpretation on (1) the very
absence of a statutory specification of the level of services to be provided children,33 and
(2) legislative history, which reported children being excluded entirely from public
education,34 extensively described two court cases challenging the exclusion and failure
to provide “adequate” services,35 and, in a few places, seemingly equated “served” with
receiving an appropriate education and “unserved” with receiving no services.36

30

James J. Gallagher, The Special Education Contract for Mildly Handicapped Children, 38
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 527, 529 (1972); Rosalyn A. Rubin et al., Factors in Special Class Placement, 39
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 525, 525 (1973); James Smith & Joan Arkans, Now More than Ever: A Case for
the Special Class, 40 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 497, 498 (1974).
31

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188.

32

Id. at 189.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 191-92.

35

Id. at 192-94 (discussing Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pa., 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), and Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)).
36

Id. at 195-96.
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The Court shored up these supports by contending (3) that a standard requiring
equality of opportunities is unworkable, and noting (4) that the Supreme Court had not
required states, under the Constitution, to create equality of educational opportunity for
children from poor school districts.37 Although the Court conceded that “isolated
statements” in the legislative history evidenced a congressional intention to maximize the
potential of children with disabilities, it found (5) those statements outweighed by other
statements mentioning educational adequacy. It further argued (6), following Pennhurst
State School v. Halderman,38 that conditional spending statutes must impose their
requirements on states “unambiguously” to be sure that the states are voluntarily
accepting the terms Congress imposes, and that the statute had not imposed a standard
beyond adequacy in an unambiguous fashion.39
Taking these arguments for the Court’s interpretation in turn, (1) the absence of
statutory language better defining appropriate education is not a basis for declaring
programs that merely confer some educational benefit to be appropriate. It would appear
much more clearly to be a concession that Congress could not at the time fully imagine
what the term might eventually encompass, and therefore, common-law interpretation
would be proper. With regard to the legislative history (2), it is hardly surprising that
Congress would focus on the most pressing and most outrageous situations when it wrote
the legislative history of the statute, and these situations, of course, were the ones where
children were out of school entirely for long periods of time. Trying to derive statutory
37

Id. at 198-200 (citing, with regard to children in impoverished school districts, San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
38

451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

39

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204 n.26.
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meaning from language about statistics of children served and unserved falls into the
same trap of guessing congressional intentions from references of sponsors to worst
cases.40 The Court misanalyzed the congressional reliance on the two district court
decisions establishing constitutional rights to education for children with disabilities. As
Justice White noted in dissent, one of the cases cited by the majority explicitly required
“educational opportunity equal to that of non-handicapped children;”41 moreover, as he
pointed out, “[t]hat these decisions served as an impetus for the Act does not . . . establish
them as the limits of the Act.”42
What of the workability (3) of an equality-based standard? Determining whether
a school system has met the educational needs of a student with a disability as adequately
as it meets the needs of students without disabilities requires a difficult comparison, but
not impossible one. There are levels of special education and general education services
that experts, or even ordinary observers, would rate as excellent, good, or poor at serving
the students’ needs. Quality may be measured by things such as qualifications of
teachers, depth and innovativeness of teaching technique, research support behind the
curriculum, consistency in application of professional best practices, conformity to state
rules, responsiveness of the administration, and other indicators. If the children without
disabilities in a given school district receive excellent services in comparison to students
throughout the nation, then so should the children with disabilities. This standard does

40

See id. at 213 (White, J., dissenting). As Justice White emphasized, even the language in the
legislative history about complete deprivation of educational services for children with disabilities was
typically linked to statements by Senators or Representatives demanding equal educational opportunity. Id.
at 213 n.1.
41

Id. at 214 n.2.

42

Id. (citing Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972)).
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not entail maximizing educational opportunities of children with disabilities, but rather
treating all children equitably.43 Moreover, even if the comparison is difficult, it is hardly
a task so bizarre that it would justify abandoning a reading of the statute otherwise
supported by interpretive evidence.44 Plainly, federal educational regulators do not
consider the standard unworkable, for they built it into the rules that govern public
education of children who meet the eligibility standards of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.45
The Court’s belief that the Constitution permits educational inequality for
children in impoverished areas (4) does not imply that Congress wished to perpetuate
educational inequality for children with disabilities as well. The Court in this instance
bootstrapped its interpretation by assuming that Congress wished to legislate the
constitutional minimum and then declaring that the standard is just that—the minimum.
In the battle of legislative history quotations (5), Justice White massed far more passages
than those found by the majority, with materials variously supporting “full educational
opportunity,” “equal educational opportunity,” education tailored to enable the child Ato
43

See Perry A. Zirkel, The Substantive Standard for FAPE: Does Section 504 Require Less than
the IDEA?, 106 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 471, 474 (1996) (“Deftly mischaracterizing the lower courts’
standard as ‘strict equality of opportunity or services,’ the Rehnquist majority criticized it as ‘an entirely
unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons.’”).
44

Cf. Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 25, 53-56 (2006) (discussing absurdity doctrine, which permits courts to avoid bizarre applications
of otherwise clear statutes).
45

29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2011) (“(a) General. A recipient [of federal
educational funds] that operates a public elementary or secondary education program or activity shall
provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped person who is in the recipient's
jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person's handicap. (b) Appropriate education. (1)
For the purpose of this subpart, the provision of an appropriate education is the provision of regular or
special education and related aids and services that (i) are designed to meet individual educational needs of
handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met. . . .”). See generally
Mark C. Weber, A New Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education Cases, 16 TEX. J. ON C.L. &
C.R. 1 (2010) (discussing application of as-adequately standard in special education cases under section
504).
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achieve his or her maximum potential,” and an education “equivalent, at least, to the one
those children who are not handicapped receive.”46
As for the application of spending statutes, in requiring narrow interpretation of
these laws (6) Pennhurst departed from precedent establishing that courts should construe
conditional spending statutes as best they can with regard to congressional purposes; if
states do not like the conditions as interpreted, they should cease participation in the
program and free themselves of their obligations to comply.47 That approach, fashioned
by Justice Harlan in Rosado v. Wyman48 eleven years before Pennhurst, is more
persuasive than the one Pennhurst advanced and Rowley adopted.49 Even if one accepts
the Pennhurst rule as a given, it need not be applied in a rigid way, but instead should be
tempered by the use of other sources of statutory construction and reliance on the
principle that states have notice of the core obligations imposed by statutes and their

46

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 213-14 (White, J., dissenting).

47

Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 421-23 (1970). Rosado involved the interpretation of complex
federal statutes establishing state conditions for receipt of federal money to support public welfare
programs. At the conclusion of its analysis, the Court commented:
It is, of course, no part of the business of this Court to evaluate, apart from federal
constitutional or statutory challenge, the merits or wisdom of any welfare programs,
whether state or federal, in the large or in the particular. It is, on the other hand,
peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less in the welfare field than in other areas
of the law, to resolve disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the States are being
expended in consonance with the conditions that Congress has attached to their use. As
Mr. Justice Cardozo stated, speaking for the Court [in] Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,
645 (1937): “When (federal) money is spent to promote the general welfare, the concept
of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the states.”
Id. at 422-23.
48

Rosado, 397 U.S. at 421-23.

49

See Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking
about Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155 (2004) (criticizing Pennhurst-Rowley
approach to interpretation of spending statutes on grounds that it leads to legislative overdrafting,
constricted executive interpretation, and unduly limited judicial reading of legislation inspired by
constitutional norms).
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continuing interpretation by administrative and judicial authorities.50 An evolving
standard for appropriate education gives sufficient notice for the states to make a fair
choice whether to stick with the program.51 At any given moment lawyers can determine
the obligations courts are likely to put into place, just as they do in other contexts.52 If
the duties become too onerous, states may withdraw from the federal program.53 The
most a given defendant will be liable for in a particular case is tuition reimbursement or
compensatory education obligations, not compensatory or punitive damages. This reality
distinguishes the IDEA situation from that in Barnes v. Gorman, where the Supreme
Court ruled that liability for a punitive damages award under the Americans with
Disabilities Act exceeded the scope of the obligations that the states could be thought of
50

See Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement Rule for
Spending Legislation, 84 TULANE L. REV. 1067, 1120 (2010) (“[T]he requisite notice should be focused on
the essential parameters around the legislative conditions, not their details.”).
51

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Legislation and the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J.
345, 407 (2008) (“[M]odern contract theory recognizes that parties may have good reasons for agreeing to
open-textured duties, and that it is utility-maximizing to enforce those duties. When a state agrees to accept
federal funds, and the law makes clear that the funds are conditioned on the state’s subjecting itself to an
open-textured standard of liability, there is no failure of notice.”) (footnote omitted).
52

See Seligmann, supra note __[Muddy], at 1120 (“There are multiple opportunities for
clarification of the legislation built into our governmental structure, and states are well aware of and fairly
sophisticated in their ability to participate in them.”).
53

See id. (“The accompanying and ensuing legislative, administrative and judicial processes, along
with the renewable cycle of funding, should be seen as mediating the ‘clarity’ appropriately demanded for
states to make their choice to participate in a program.”). States make reasoned choices whether to accept
federal money and with it the duties imposed by federal law; there even appears to be a recent trend
towards refusing federal funds and the obligations that come with them. See Tom McNamara, Obama and
Republicans Stand on Opposite Sides of the High-Speed Tracks, NEED TO KNOW ON PBS (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/economy/obama-and-republicans-stand-on-opposite-sides-of-thehigh-speed-tracks/7527/ (“Gov. Rick Scott (R.-Fla.) became the third Republican state leader to turn down
federal dollars for high-speed rail. Wisconsin and Ohio first refused a combined billion dollars for lines
that would have connected the Midwest; Florida now rejects a link between Tampa and Orlando, forgoing
more than $2 billion. Just as in Wisconsin, the money in Florida would have covered almost the entire cost
of construction. And just as in Wisconsin, the governor argued that high-speed rail would forever obligate
the state to subsidize the cost to keep trains running.”). In the early days of the federal special education
program under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, New Mexico declined to participate.
N.M. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 853 (10th Cir. 1982) (“New Mexico has
chosen not to participate in the [Education for the] Handicapped Act program.”).
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as assuming under remedial provisions crafted for a spending clause program.54 In two
of the three cases establishing and extending tuition reimbursement remedies, the Court
did not even address an argument based on the lack of notice to the states;55 in the third
and most recent one, it rejected the contention.56 The instance in which it relied on the
argument is in Arlington Central School District v. Murphy,57 refusing to award expert
witness fees to successful parents—not a standard for liability for existing forms of relief
but rather a wholly new category of remedy comparable to the punitive damages in
Barnes. In two post-Rowley cases in which the Supreme Court imposed the obligation to
provide potentially expensive58 services under the Court’s interpretation of IDEA, the
Court rejected arguments based on Pennhurst’s contract idea.59
54

536 U.S. 181, 187-88 (2002) (vacating punitive damages award of $1.2 million). The applicable
provision of the ADA,42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006), incorporates the remedies under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2006), which in turn incorporates the remedies under
title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). The Rehabilitation Act and title VI of the Civil
Rights Act forbid discrimination by federal grantees under the federal government’s spending power. See
Barnes, 536 U.S. at 185-86.
55

Florence County Sch.. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) (upholding reimbursement for parental
placement of child at school not approved by state authorities); Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of
Educ., 471 US. 359 (1985) (upholding reimbursement for unilateral parental placement of child).
56

Forest Grove Sch. Dist v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2009) (upholding reimbursement claim
for child not previously enrolled in special education on ground that states were on notice of authority to
order reimbursement); see Seligmann, supra note __, at 1112 (“Forest Grove does suggest that the
interpretation of Spending Clause legislation need not be driven predominantly by the clear statement rule .
. . . That Justices Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito joined in Forest Grove’s reasoning suggests that the use of
judicial precedents and congressional ratification of those precedents to find the requisite notice, at least for
subsequent spending cycles, may be an established part of a clear statement inquiry.”).
57

See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).

58

At least in one of the two cases. See Cedar Rapids Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 85
(1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that services would cost minimum of $18,000 per year).
59

Cedar Rapids Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 78-79 (1999) (upholding claim for
extensive health services for ventilator-dependent child); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883,
891 n.8 (1984) (upholding claim for catheterization of child at school); see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd.
of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 182-83 (2005) (relying on notice from general principles embodied in statute and
construction of other laws to uphold liability for retaliation under spending clause statute); Bennett v. Ky.
Dept’ of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666 (1985) (allowing recovery of misused federal funds, noting that general
guidance on improper expenditures sufficed to provide notice to federal grantee); Mansourian v. Regents of
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Reluctant to create an interpretive structure similar to that the Supreme Court
ultimately manufactured, the lower courts in Rowley stated that “[t]he Act itself does not
define ‘appropriate education,’ . . . but leaves ‘to the courts and the hearing officers’ the
responsibility of ‘giving content to the requirement of an ‘appropriate education.’’’60 The
lower courts had good reason to reach this conclusion. A Harvard Law Review note that
received wide attention in the period before the Supreme Court’s decision concluded that
Congress had left the term open to future interpretation by judges and hearing officers,61
that is, essentially, to common-law development. The note commented on the
opportunities for common-lawmaking and warned of overspecification of standards:
The development of a “common law” for decisionmaking under the Act
would eliminate much of the ambiguity of the current standards. There is,
however, the danger that it may rigidify those standards and stifle the
potential for creative response under the Act. Hearing officers should be
careful to regard earlier decisions only as general guidelines for principled

Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 967-69 (9th Cir. 2010) (imposing liability under title IX of Education
Amendments for failure to provide athletic opportunities for women, relying on adequate notice of
underlying obligation).
60

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176 (describing views of court of appeals and district court; quoting Rowley
v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 536, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
61

Note, Enforcing the Right to an Appropriate Education: The Education of All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1105, 1125 (1979) (AAt the center of many complaints will
be a conflict over the nature and quality of services to which a handicapped child is entitled. Parents will
assert that the law requires certain services to be provided. The school representativesBaware of the
constraints of their own budgetBwill contend that “appropriate” means something less. The language of the
Act provides no clear guidelines for resolving such a conflict. Judges and hearing officers must develop
standards for evaluating the facts of individual cases.@) (footnotes omitted).
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decisionmaking and not as mandates that a particular program is the
appropriate placement for any child with a particular type of handicap.62
Even if the Supreme Court had overturned the decision to grant Amy
Rowley an interpreter, had it done so “with a minimum of exposition,”63 the
denial of the service would simply be one of a mosaic of common-law
interpretations of appropriate education. Educators, parents, and others would
know schools need not provide interpreters to children in lower grades with
partial hearing, good lipreading skills and the native intelligence to perform at
above average levels and pass easily from grade to grade if given regular tutoring
and speech therapy.64 Cases involving other children and different circumstances
would be weighed differently. New approaches would be permissible as long as
they were based on sufficient reasons.65
Curiously, Justice Rehnquist at one point in the opinion invited later courts
to confine the Rowley decision to its peculiar facts:
We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the
adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by
62

Id. at 1127. In commenting that this common lawmaking task was difficult but still feasible, the
note referred to Judge Henry Friendly’s famous article, In Praise of ErieBAnd of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-22 (1964). Note, supra note __, at 1127 n. 148.
63

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 443 n.* (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).

64

Of course, the fact that Amy Rowley was passing easily from grade to grade despite
understanding less than half of what was said in class, Rowley, 458 U.S. at 215 (White, J., dissenting),
lends support to Bonnie Tucker’s inference that, like Tucker herself, a deaf person skilled in lipreading,
Amy was learning in spite of school rather than because of it. Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Board of Education
of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 235, 241 & n.31
(1983).
65

See generally FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW 81 (1912) (“Our grand
pervading principle of Reasonableness . . . may almost be called the life of the modern Common Law . . .
.”).
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the Act. Because in this case we are presented with a handicapped child
who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services,
and who is performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public
school system, we confine our analysis to that situation.66
As he must have known, however, lower courts would extend the Court’s analysis
beyond immediately similar cases, and the broad language the opinion employed in
asserting that Congress intended only some educational benefit guaranteed that would be
so.67 If the decision had simply been a no to the Rowley family, coupled with a frank
admission that the Court was not fully certain what Congress intended, the lower courts,
over a period of time, would have been able to flesh out what appropriate education
means, free of the Court’s restrictive interpretation.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, hinted at what might have been. He
declared that “Congress unambiguously stated that it intended ‘to take a more active role
under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped
children are provided equal educational opportunity.’”68 Rather than a matter of
receiving educational benefits and passing from grade to grade, “the question is whether
Amy’s program, viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity to understand and
participate in the classroom that was substantially equal to that given her non66

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.

67

It remains true, however, that many lower courts have resisted Rowley, and frequently have
minimized or distinguished it. See infra text accompanying notes ____.
68

Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9 (1975)).
Justice Blackmun added the emphasis to the quotation, and in the next sentence referred to his separate
opinion in Pennhurst, pointing out that federal statutory enactments establishing the rights of people with
disabilities are more than “politically self-serving but essentially meaningless language.” Id. (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 32 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
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handicapped classmates.”69 In light of the accommodations already provided to Amy
Rowley, Justice Blackmun felt that the school did not need to add the services of a signlanguage interpreter even if the Court were to apply a definition of appropriate education
that embraces equal educational opportunity.70
Had it been allowed to develop, the common law of appropriate education might
have developed a content not fully predictable in the 1980s nor knowable today. It might
have employed Justice Blackmun’s interpretation, an evidently flexible standard
“predicated on equal educational opportunity and equal access to the educational
process.”71 Or, following the approach of the lower courts in Rowley, it may have
assumed the more precise form of proportional maximization, that is, “affording a child
with a disability an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the
opportunity provided to . . . children [without disabilities].”72 It may have placed a
greater stress on the comparison of the child’s benefits to his or her intellectual
capacity.73 Or the standard might not have emerged until a run a caselaw appeared and

69

Id. at 211.

70

Id. at 211. In adopting this position, he relied as well on the principle of giving deference to the
hearing officer who originally ruled on the case, who had upheld the school district’s position and denied
the interpretation services. Id.
71

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). The divergent results
reached by Justice Blackmun and the lower courts in Rowley demonstrate the flexibility of that standard in
comparison to proportional maximization.
72

Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 536, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

73

Justice Alito, while sitting on the Third Circuit, crafted such a standard by combining Rowley
and various Third Circuit glosses on it: “[T]he IEP [must be] ‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the child to
receive ‘meaningful educational benefits’ in light of the child’s ‘intellectual potential.’” Shore Reg’l High
Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.) (citations omitted).
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an observer, looking backward, would finally be able to put a label on what courts were
doing. 74
III. APPROPRIATE EDUCATION AS PROPORTIONAL MAXIMIZATION
Among competing interpretations of appropriate education, proportional
maximization has much to recommend it. The congressional debates emphasize
equalizing educational services for children with and without disabilities and educating
children with disabilities to promote self-sufficiency in adulthood.75 The legislative
history also refers to Brown v. Board of Education76 and its insistence on equal
education.77 The equality of services theme sounds clearly in the committee reports.78
Senator Stafford, one of the Act’s sponsors, made a comment typical of those of the law’s
74

See Field, supra note __[Harv.], at 944 (“Case-by-case development is sometimes the wisest
choice; sometimes situations or even solutions emerge that no one could foresee at the time of the
legislation.”).
75

121 CONG. REC. 19482-83 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); 121 CONG. REC. 19483 (remarks
of Sen. Stafford); 121 CONG. REC. 19504 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 121 CONG. REC. 19505
(1975) (remarks of Sen. Beall); 121 CONG. REC. 23704 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Brademas); 121 CONG.
REC. 25538 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Cornell); 121 CONG. REC. 25540 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Grassley);
121 CONG. REC. 37025 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Perkins); 121 CONG. REC. 37030 (1975) (remarks of Rep.
Mink); 121 CONG. REC. 37412 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Taft); 121 CONG. REC. 37413 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Williams); 121 CONG. REC. 37418-18 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
76

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

77

S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975). The Supreme Court ignored this reference in Rowley, even
though it had received attention in a prominent pre-Rowley circuit court decision. See Kruelle v. New
Castle County Sch. Dist, 642 F.2d 687, 690 & n. 6 (3d Cir. 1981). Professor Zirkel states that the
legislative history of the Act “only references Brown briefly, without further analysis of application,” but
later concludes:
Symbolically, arguably as a moral imperative, Brown served as a landmark, in terms of
representing a sea of change in the legal approach to students that based on group
characteristics faced separation or exclusion. This change, via the bridge of the consent
decrees in PARC and Mills, had a direct impact on the passage of the IDEA. The
commonality includes the concepts of access and equal opportunity.
Perry A. Zirkel, Does Brown v. Board of Education Play a Prominent Role in Special Education Law, 34
J.L. & EDUC. 255, 263, 270 (2005).
78

See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9 (1975) (stating that Act guarantees “equal educational opportunity”
for children with disabilities); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 13 (1975) (“Each child requires an
education plan tailored to achieve his or her maximum potential.”).
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supporters: “We can all agree that education [of a child with a disability] should be
equivalent, at least, to the one those children who are not handicapped receive.”79 As
noted above, the members of the Rowley Court agreed that the cases asserting a right to
appropriate education for children with disabilities helped motivate Congress to adopt the
Act, and Mills and PARC feature prominently in the legislative history.80 Although both
cases focused significantly on children receiving no services, they did not suggest that
merely providing some educational benefit would be sufficient. Indeed, the Mills case
employed strong language requiring equality of publicly supported education for children
with disabilities.81 The PARC consent decree spoke of access to appropriate education,
not of access as appropriate education.82 Other right-to-education cases also spoke of

79

121 CONG. REC. 19483 (1975) (quoted in Rowley, 458 U.S. at 214 (White, J., dissenting).

80

See supra text accompanying notes __________.

81

Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (“The Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), stated: . . . ‘ [Educational] opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.’ (emphasis
supplied). . . . Thus the Board of Education has an obligation to provide whatever specialized instruction
that will benefit the child. . . . [In Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967)] Judge Wright
concluded ‘(F)rom these considerations the court draws the conclusion that the doctrine of equal
educational opportunity-the equal protection clause in its application to public school education-is in its full
sweep a component of due process binding on the District under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.’ In Hobson v. Hansen, supra, Judge Wright found that denying poor public school children
educational opportunities equal to that available to more affluent public school children was violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A fortiori, the defendants’ conduct here, denying plaintiffs
and their class not just an equal publicly supported education but all publicly supported education while
providing such education to other children, is violative of the Due Process Clause.”).
82

See Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. Pa.., 343 F. Supp. 279, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
The court’s description of the decree and the decree itself use the term “appropriate” to modify “program of
education and training” or similar words, a meaning that does not equate to some educational benefit, but
that does not give much additional guidance with respect to comparisons to services provided children
without disabilities. See, e.g., id. at 1258 (defendants must “immediately re-evaluate the named plaintiffs,
and to accord to each of them, as soon as possible but in no event later than October 13, 1971, access to a
free public program of education and training appropriate to his learning capacities; . . . provide, as soon
as possible but in no event later than September 1, 1972, to every retarded person between the ages of six
and twenty-one years as of the date of this Order and thereafter, access to a free public program of
education and training appropriate to his learning capacities. . . .”) (emphasis added).
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appropriate education; the meaning of the term was less than crystalline, but there is no
hint that it was supposed to mean merely some educational benefit.83
It is possible that Congress may have been looking to contemporary sources other
than the right-to-education cases for the meaning of appropriate education. Education
commentary giving content to the term in the period before passage of the Act is scant,
but one prominent source from that era used it to signify a level and type of services that
match the child’s needs and capacities, a standard that is higher than that adopted by
Rowley, albeit one that makes less of an explicit comparison to services provided children
without disabilities than a proportional maximization test does.84
The post-Act and pre-Rowley commentary and caselaw lined up strongly in favor
of proportional maximization as the content of appropriate education. The Harvard Law
Review note stated that “an appropriate education for a particular child would require
services aimed at developing the child’s intellectual capacity to the same degree that the
school sought to develop the ‘normal’ abilities of its nonhandicapped students.”85 James
Stark, an associate professor at the University of Connecticut Law School and director of
the school’s clinic, which specialized in special education litigation, wrote that “the Act
is premised on notions of proportional equality.”86 Pre-Rowley courts added their

83

See Panitch v. Wisconsin, 390 F. Supp. 611, 613 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (using term appropriate
education to describe services matching child’s needs and capacities); McMillan v. Board of Educ., 331 F.
Supp. 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (same).
84

Peter Kuriloff et al., Legal Reform and Educational Change, 41 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 35, 38
(1974) (distinguishing between children Aplaced somewhere@ and those “placed in appropriate programs,”
in compliance with court settlement).
85

Note, supra note __, at 1125-26.

86

James H. Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of Scarce Resources on the
Implementation of Pub. L. 94-142, 14 CONN. L. REV. 477, 502 (1982).
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endorsements of proportional maximization to those of the scholars.87 For example, in
Gladys J. v. Pearland Independent School District,88 the court declared that the Act
entitled a child with severe mental impairments with “educational opportunities
commensurate with that provided other children in the public schools,”89 and ordered
more intensive services for the child than those the school district had offered. In fact,
before Rowley, the competition was mainly between those who urged the use of
proportional maximization and those who favored a standard of maximization of
potential without regard to the comparison to the quality of services offered students
without disabilities.90
It is hardly surprising, then, that the lower courts in Rowley opted for a
proportional maximization approach.91 The district court viewed the choice as between

87

See, e.g., Springdale Sch. Dist. v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1981); Battle v. Pa., 629
F.2d 269, 277 (3d Cir. 1980); Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 912 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Pinkerton v.
Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 113 (W.D. Va. 1981); Hines v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 403, 406
(E.D.N.C. 1980).
88

520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981).

89

Id. at 875.

90

Many authorities favored this absolute or non-comparative maximization standard. See, e.g.,
Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 173-74 (D. Del. 1980), aff’d, 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981); DeWalt v.
Burkholder, 1979 Educ. Handicapped L. Rep. 551:550 (E.D. Va. 1980); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp.
583, 603-04 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded sub nom. Battle v. Pa., 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980); Marc S. Krass,
The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL.
L.F. 1016, 1065; Comment, Self-Sufficiency Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: A
Suggested Judicial Approach, 1981 DUKE L.J. 516, 526. A few sources, however, foreshadowed the
approach ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court, notably the dissenting opinion in the Second Circuit
Rowley decision and one student note, Bruce G. Sheffler, Note, Education of Handicapped Children: The
IEP Process and the Search for an Appropriate Education, 56 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 109-10 (1981)
(criticizing views of district court in Rowley). The legislative history of the Act provides some support for
the absolute maximization interpretation. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 13 (1975) (“Each child requires an
education plan tailored to achieve his or her maximum potential.”).
91

The use of the word “maximization” as part of a standard based on equality may be a rhetorical
error (one that the lower courts in Rowley avoided by talking about “full potential”), even though the word
is prominent in the Act’s legislative history. As discussed below, the word conjures images of Cadillacs
rather than Chevrolets (in the modern era, perhaps BMWs rather than Hyundais). The emphasis really
belongs on “proportional,” or if one prefers another term, “commensurate.” Children with disabilities are
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“an ‘adequate’ education that is, an education substantial enough to facilitate a child’s
progress from one grade to another and to enable him or her to earn a high school
diploma”92 or, on the other hand, “one which enables the handicapped child to achieve
his or her full potential.”93 The court found a middle ground between those two
extremes, one that “would require that each handicapped child be given an opportunity to
achieve his full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
children.”94 The court identified support for this standard in the regulations promulgated
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,95 the right to education cases leading

entitled to something comparable in terms of quality to what children without disabilities receive. No
more, no less: Cadillacs if children without disabilities are getting a Cadillac education, Chevrolets if
children without disabilities are getting Chevrolet educations. Determining in any given case what the
motoring metaphor means will present a challenge, but it is hardly an impossibility. See supra text
accompanying notes _________. A student comment even worked the automobile brands into its title, but
failed to respond to the point that the motoring metaphor embodies a comparison between education for
children in general education and those receiving special education, suggesting that proportional
maximization or other equality-related measures are in fact workable. See Judith DeBerry, When Parents
and Educators Clash: Are Special Education Students Entitled to a Cadillac Education?, 34 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 503 (2003). When discussing general education, it makes sense to talk about a “Cadillac” school (or,
for that matter, a clunker). See Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 755 (2004) (discussing education provided by wealthy school districts). Similarly, it makes
sense to ask whether the services provided children with disabilities are as high in quality as those provided
other children.
92

Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980),
rev’d, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
93

Id.

94

Id.

95

29 U.S.C. ' 794 (2006). These regulations define “appropriate education,” for purposes of the
non-discrimination law, as “the provision of regular or special education and related aids and services that
are . . . designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of
nonhandicapped persons are met . . . .” 45 C.F.R. ' 84.33(b) (1980). See Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 533.
The Supreme Court criticized the reliance on these regulations, see Rowley 458 U.S. at 186 n.8, and in a
subsequent decision tried to eliminate all reliance on section 504 in cases governed by the special education
law, see Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012-16 (finding that Education for All Handicapped Children
Act preempted possible claims based on section 504 or equal protection). Congress, however, overruled
Smith, and restored the availability of section 504 in special education cases, subject to an exhaustion rule.
20 U.S.C. ' 1415(l) (2006). Commentators noted that the congressional action restored the possibility of
claims for proportional equality in educational services for children with disabilities based on the section
504 regulations. Thomas F. Guernsey, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 42 U.S.C. '
1983, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Interaction Following the Handicapped
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to passage of the Act, and “common sense.”96 The common sense argument is
significant. As the court pointed out, some children with disabilities can do far better
than merely pass from grade to grade, but even the best public schools rarely have the
resources to enable every child to reach his or her full potential.97 A middle approach is
the best. The court conceded that the standard may be difficult to apply in some
instances, but in the case before it found ample evidence of the child’s great potential and
extreme effort, and thought that the school ought to confer the same degree of benefit on
her that her classmates received by attending class.98 The court of appeals, in a relatively
brief opinion, praised the approach of the district court, adopting its findings of facts and
conclusions of law.99 The court, however, limited its decision “to the unique facts of this
case.”100
The Second Circuit’s words of caution about the reach of its decision should carry
weight. With all that may be said in favor of a proportional maximization standard, it
remains true that the interpretation may not be the only one that could be considered

Children’s Protection Act of 1986, 68 NEB. L. REV. 564, 591-92 (1989); Mark C. Weber, The
Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 417-21 (1990)
[hereinafter, Weber, Transformation]. In the period since passage of the statute overruling Smith, however,
most of the section 504 caselaw concerning primary and secondary education has concerned services for
children who do not meet IDEA’s definitional provisions but still have a disability for purposes of section
504’s definition, and claims for damages for intentional discrimination. See MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE § 21.6(3) (3d ed. 2008 & supp. 2010) (collecting cases). In
discussing the origins of the Act, Senator Stafford emphasized its close harmony with the section 504
regulations. Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator’s Perspective, 3 VT. L. REV.
71, 80-82 (1982).
96

Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 534-36.

99

Rowley, 632 F.2d at 947.

100

Id. at 948.
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persuasive. A common-law process might lead there, but perhaps it could lead to a
standard with greater flexibility (such as Justice Blackmun’s), a standard that looks to the
child’s intellectual potential, or to no standard at all that can be described with a single,
pithy phrase.
IV. HAS CONGRESS RATIFIED THE SOME-BENEFIT STANDARD
FOR APPROPRIATE EDUCATION?
Congress has not disturbed the Rowley decision despite reenacting the statute that
is now IDEA several times since 1982.101 To some courts, the failure to change the
statute’s language regarding appropriate education evidences Congress’s ratification of
Rowley.102 These courts adopt the view that cases that interpret statutes should be given a
special degree of stare decisis protection, and that Congress is expected to be aware of
Supreme Court interpretations of statutory language when it reenacts.103 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has frequently disregarded this rule, using new discoveries about the
original intentions of Congress or other bases on which to deeply erode, or even overrule
previous statutory interpretations, including ones in which the language was reenacted.
Perhaps the most prominent example is Monnell v. Department of Social Services,104

101

See Pub.L. No. 98-199, 97 Stat. 1357 (1983); Pub.L. No. 99-457, 100 Stat. 1145 (1986); Pub.L.
No. 101-476, § 901(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42 (1990); Pub.L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997); Pub.L.
No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004).
102

See J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 2010); Mr. C. v. Me. Sch.
Admin. Dist. No. 6, 538 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300-01 (D. Me. 2008).
103

J.L., 592 F.3d at 948; Mr. C., 538 F. Supp. 2d at 301. See generally Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”); Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) (“The long time failure of Congress to alter the act After it has been
judicially construed, and the enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial
construction is effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct
one.”).
104

436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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which reexamined nineteenth century legislative history to overrule the portion of
Monroe v. Pape105 that held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not permit municipal liability.106
In other noteworthy cases, Griffin v. Breckenridge overruled earlier Supreme Court
precedent that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) requires state action; it extended the statute to purely
private conspiracies to deprive people of civil rights.107 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770108 overruled Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,109 rereading the
Norris-LaGuardia Act110 to permit injunctions against strikes called in violation of a nostrike clause in a collective bargaining agreement.111 Closer to the present time and the
disability civil rights context, Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources112 interpreted language in the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)113 and Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988
(FHAA)114 that had been copied from 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to forbid awards of attorneys’
fees for suits that acted as catalysts for voluntary conduct by defendants achieving the
105

365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961).

106

Whether the legislative history is the strongest support for the Court’s decision is subject to
debate. A prominent scholar has observed that “the reasons for overruling Monroe have little to do with the
legislative history of the 1871 statute, and a lot to do with the practical and theoretical evolution of the
statute.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1396 (1988).
107

403 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1971).

108

398 U.S. 195 (1970).

109

370 U.S. 195 (1962).

110

29 U.S.C. § 104 (2006) (current codification).

111

See generally Eskridge, supra note __, at 1390 (citing Boys Markets as paradigm case for more
flexible approach to stare decisis regarding statutory precedents).
112

532 U.S. 598 (2001).

113

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3607 (2006) (current codification).

114

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12113 (West 2011) (current codification).
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objectives of the plaintiffs’ litigation. The Supreme Court came to this conclusion
despite the existence of tolerably clear Supreme Court precedent115 and crystal clear
lower court precedent,116 of which Congress was well aware,117 that had read § 1988 to
permit the awards, prior to enactment of the ADA and FHAA.
Scholarly sources cast doubt on the proposition that statutory precedents should
be given special stare decisis protection, even when reenactment has occurred. Professor
Eskridge notes that congressional failure to change a judicially imposed interpretation
may indicate approval, but may as easily signify apathy; disapproval but disagreement
about how to change the interpretation; disapproval but procedural obstacles to new
legislation, such as committee or individual opposition, filibusters, threatened vetoes and
the like; disapproval but existence of more important issues dominating the legislative
agenda; or disapproval but failure to act due to logrolling or compromises.118 As

115

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 763 (1987) (describing entitlement to fees as “settled law” when
“voluntary action by the defendant . . . affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief sought” and reserving
question of when catalyst theory supports fees awards); see also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992)
(also recognizing catalyst interpretation).
116

E.g., Nadeau v Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279-81 (1st Cir. 1978); see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at
626 & n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing twelve other court of appeals decisions predating 1987 Hewitt v.
Helms decision).
117

Senators Strom Thurmond and Orrin Hatch introduced a bill to amend § 1988 to overturn the
catalyst rule several years before enactment of the FHAA and ADA. See 131 Cong. Rec. S22356 (1985)
(remarks of Sen. Hatch) (“Due to the protracted nature of some litigation, a claim may be rendered moot by
State or Federal legislation enacted prior to judicial resolution of the conflict. Under existing case law such
a turn of events would not preclude an award of attorneys’ fees where a court determined that the case was
a catalyst for the legislative change.”). This situation is precisely the one in Buckhannon. See 532 U.S.
598, 601 & n.2 (2001) (describing dismissal on ground of mootness after state legislature repealed
challenged rule).
118

Eskridge, supra note __, at 1405. For further support, Eskridge quotes Justices Frankfurter
(“[W]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal
principle.” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940)) and Scalia (“I think we should admit that
vindication by Congressional inaction is a canard.” Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480
U.S. 616, 672 (1987)). Id. at 1405 & n. 215. A subsequent article suggests that a presumption of
correctness should be given a judicial construction of a statute after legislative inaction when the relevant
judicial interpretation is one that is settled or authoritative and has created public or private interests in
reliance on the interpretation, what Eskridge terms a “building block interpretation.” William N. Eskridge,
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Eskridge points out, a more flexible attitude to following or not following statutory
precedents is a better way to protect the primary goal of stare decisis, the orderly
development of the law.119
Adhering to Rowley’s some-benefit approach on the basis of assumed
congressional acquiescence is particularly inappropriate if the common-law interpretation
of IDEA’s appropriate education guarantee is correct. Professor Eskridge cites the view
of Justice Stevens that ordinarily stare decisis should be rigidly followed when
interpreting statutes, but not when Congress phrases a statute in sweeping, general terms,
and expects the courts to interpret it by developing rules on a case-by-case basis in
common-law style, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Sherman Act.120 If, as suggested here,
IDEA is similar to these open-ended laws and appropriate education carries a meaning to
be developed over time, a flexible approach to the term is the only sensible one.121
Congressional reenactment of the language should not be taken as preserving Rowley in
amber.

Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 70 (1988). Articles putting forth similar views
include John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into
“Speculative Unrealities,” 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 741 (1985) (“[T]here exists no legal or functional
justification for the imputation of any meaning to the necessarily frequent and prolonged silences of
Congress.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 476
(1989) (“[S]tare decisis and post-enactment history should play a limited role in interpretation.”); Articles
critical of a flexible approach to application of statutory precedents include Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let
Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989).
119

Eskridge, supra note __ [Geo.], at 1392-93.

120

Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 & n. 12 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
121

Notably, Boys Markets is a paradigm case for overruling statutory precedents, and it involves an
interpretation of federal law regarding enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, a topic that Justice
Douglas declared to be one in which Congress intended the development of a federal common law. See
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, (1957); see also Field, supra note __, at 940 n. 245
(describing common-law-style development of labor-management law).
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Moreover, if Congress is ordinarily expected to be aware of Supreme Court
interpretations of a statute when it reenacts, it is also likely to be aware of prominent
lower court interpretations. The lower courts, as documented from sources stretching
back more than twenty years, have frequently, if subtly, departed from a some-benefit
approach.122 It is as likely that later Congresses intended to endorse those lower-court
departures from Rowley as it is that these Congresses intended to enshrine Rowley’s
some-benefit reading of appropriate education.
V. TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF APPROPRIATE EDUCATION
Are there prospects for common-law development of the meaning of appropriate
education despite the reality of Rowley? The answer appears to be a qualified yes. Over
the years, many courts have not hewed strictly to the Rowley some-benefit line,123 though
the Supreme Court’s decision has kept them from adopting any clear alternative based on
proportional maximization or equality of opportunity.124 More than twenty years ago, an
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See sources cited supra note __ and accompanying text.
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An article by Scott Johnson contends that Rowley’s “‘some educational benefit’ standard no
longer accurately reflects the requirements of the IDEA” in light of state constitutional law litigation
establishing obligations to provide higher levels of educational services; the standards-based education
movement directed towards increasing expectations and performance levels; and the focus on high
expectations and enhanced educational results in the 1997 revision to IDEA. Scott F. Johnson,
Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 561, 567
(explaining developments altering educational and legal landscape since early 1980s). With respect to the
1997 amendments, Johnson emphasizes the provision requiring states to adopt performance goals for
children with disabilities that are consistent with other goals and standards set for all children. Id. at 578
(citing 20 U.S.C. ' 1412(a)(16)). As he notes, the legislative history and findings in the 1997 law also
support having high expectations for children with disabilities and insuring high quality services and
maximum access to the general curriculum. Id. at 578-79 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-95, at 83-84 (1997)
and 20 U.S.C. ' 1400(c)(5)(A)). For an additional argument that the 1997 law in fact raises the appropriate
education standard beyond that established in Rowley, see Tara L. Eyer, Comment, Greater Expectations:
How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 103
DICK. L. REV. 613 (1999).
124

Professor Perry Zirkel suggests that Rowley’s emphasis on the Act as guaranteeing access is
obsolete in light of the large numbers of children now in special education; at the same time, he contends,
an alternative vision of the Act premised on equality is no longer applicable given the large amounts of
money spent on educating children with disabilities. Perry A. Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special
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article of mine identified three categories of cases in which lower courts had refused to
embrace the broader implications of the Rowley decision: (1) cases involving children
with severe disabilities, for whom extensive services are required for progress that is
meaningful; (2) cases involving children who can advance from grade to grade, but only
with significant levels of services, essentially Rowley’s converse proposition; and (3)
cases involving ideas from the statute that were not developed in Rowley, such as the
least restrictive environment and individualization principles, which again might call for
extensive services for a given child to succeed in a mainstreamed setting or to overcome
unique and difficult impediments to learning.125 More recently, Professor Seligmann has
observed that courts in disputes over services for children with autism heed the message
from Rowley that they should defer to school districts on substantive decisions regarding
the methodology for serving children and intensity levels for services provided, but
nonetheless may overturn a child’s IEP and order different services on the ground that the
Education, 195 EDUC. L. REP. 35, 35-36 (2005). The mere fact that more is being spent, on average, on
educating children with disabilities than educating children without disabilities does not mean that children
with disabilities are being treated equally in the sense that they are afforded comparable opportunities or
that their potentials are being developed to the same degree that other children’s are. The premise of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and other modern civil rights legislation for individuals with disabilities is
that different, and at times quite specifically more expensive, treatment may be necessary to treat people
equally. See Michael Ashley Stein, Employing People with Disabilities, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 51, 57 (Peter David Blanck ed. 2000) (discussing costs of
accommodation in relation to general social benefits of ending discrimination and moral imperative of
integration and equality). Moreover, although it is a commonplace assumption that more is expended in
educating a child with a disability (that is, of course, the reason for the federal funding under IDEA), that
assumption is rarely critically examined. It could well be that the educational expenditures for
extracurriculars, including sports, music, and other enrichment activities, and the costs of various advanced
academic programs, especially at the high school level, benefit students without disabilities in a much
greater proportion than students with disabilities. Certainly, schools spend more on some individual
students without disabilities than on some students with disabilities.
125

See Weber, Transformation, supra note ___ [Davis], at 377-404 (collecting and analyzing cases
to date); see also Elena M. Gallegos, Beyond Board of Education v. Rowley: Educational Benefit for the
Handicapped?, 97 AM. J. EDUC. 258, 259-60 (1989) (arguing that courts depart from Rowley in cases with
compelling facts); Mark G. Yudof, Education for the Handicapped: Rowley in Perspective, 92 AM. J.
EDUC. 163, 174 (1984) (suggesting that courts might not apply Rowley’s restrictive language); Perry A.
Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v. Rowley: Razing the Door and
Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L. REV. 466, 469 (1983) (same).
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program was not developed following proper procedures.126 Though Professor
Seligmann does not state the proposition in such stark terms, the conclusion may be
drawn that when given an out because of a procedural failing by the school district, many
courts require school districts to provide autism services that are greater than what a
some-benefit standard would demand. Cases similar to those identified by me and by
Professor Seligmann have continued to proliferate,127 though it remains true that many,
many courts rely on Rowley to deny requested educational services or placements.128

126

Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to Roost: Judicial Review of Autism Special
Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUVENILE L. & POL’Y 217, 219-20, 274-80 (2005).
127

A sampling should suffice. On intensive programs for children with severe disabilities:
Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that district court did not
err in finding that IEP calling for public school placement was not appropriate for child with severe
behavioral disabilities); Bucks County Dep’t of Mental Health/Mental Retardation v. Pennsylvania, 379
F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding child with autism entitled to greater services than offered); R.E. v. N.Y.
City Dep’t of Educ., No. 10 CIV. 3176, 2011 WL 924895 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011) (same) R.K. v. N.Y.
City Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-4478 KAM, 2011 WL 1131492 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011) (same), adopted,
2011 WL 1131522 (E.D.N.Y. Mar 28, 2011); Linda E. v. Bristol Warren Reg’l Sch. Dist., 758 F. Supp. 2d
75, 55 IDELR 218 (D.R.I. Dec. 1, 2010) (finding child with severe behavior difficulties entitled to
specialized placement). On individualization: Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P., 582 F.3d 576 (5th Cir.
2009) (finding program insufficient for individual child’s needs); Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, No.
03-cv-2582-RPM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105978 (D. Colo. Oct. 30, 2009) (same). On enhanced services
to enable children to remain in least restrictive setting, keep up in the mainstream curriculum, or narrow the
gap: C.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding decisions of hearing officer
and district court that although child made progress in reading over relevant two school years, education
offered was not appropriate when gap between student and peers increased each year); Woods v. Northport
Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09-CV-243, 2011 WL 1230813 (W.D. Mich., March 31, 2011) (finding
services inadequate when child did not progress in general curriculum); Breanne C. v. S. York County Sch.
Dist., 732 F. Supp. 2d 474 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (finding district’s services inadequate when child did well in
mainstream only though intensive efforts of parents at home and outside tutoring); Kingsport City Sch. Sys.
v. J.R., No. 2:06-CV-234, 2008 WL 4138109 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2008) (finding behavior plan inadequate
when it failed to provide training in negotiating mainstreamed environment without assistance); Waukee
Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Douglas L., 51 IDELR 15 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (affirming decision of hearing officer that
school district educating child with cognitive impairment and multiple disabilities gave insufficient
consideration to related services to permit receipt of core academic instruction in general education
setting); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12 v. Minn. Dep’t of Educ., 788 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 2010) (requiring
supplemental aids and services to permit child to participate in mainstream extracurriculars).
128

Representative cases include: J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2010)
(overturning and remanding decision as to appropriateness of program in light of continuing vitality of
Rowley standard); T.Y. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ. Region 4, 584 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding
determination that one-on-one aide provided sufficient benefits in addressing problem behaviors), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3277 (May 17, 2010); Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir.
2008) (ruling that child with autism was offered appropriate education in public school program despite
fact that program failed adequately to address child’s inability to generalize functional behavior learned at
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What is newsworthy in the evolution of the Rowley doctrine is the appearance of
several additional types of cases pushing the limits of the some-benefit standard: (1)
Those in which a program is found inadequate because it fails to address all areas of the
child’s disability or all of the child’s educational needs; (2) Cases in which a program is
deemed not to provide appropriate education because the services are not based on peerreviewed research; and (3) Cases in which a program fails the appropriate education test
because the IEP does not include other necessary components or lacks meaningful goals
for the child.
(1) All Areas of Disability. IDEA compels school districts to evaluate children “in
all areas of suspected disability,”129 and further provides that the IEP must contain
measurable annual goals designed to “meet each of the child’s . . . educational needs that
result from the child’s disability,”130 and must include a statement of special education
and related services that will be provided for the child “to advance appropriately toward
attaining annual goals.”131 However, it might be possible to read Rowley to permit a
school to neglect one or another area of need, as long as the program as a whole confers
some benefit.132 Courts are avoiding that reading, and instead are requiring schools to

school to home and other environments); A.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“IDEA’s
FAPE standards are far more modest than to require that a child excel or thrive.”); Brad K. v. Board of
Educ., No. 10 C 0534, 2011 WL 1362667 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2011) (upholding determination by hearing
officer that half-day early childhood program met adequacy standard); Seladoki v. Bellaire Local Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., No. C2-07-1272, 2009 WL 3127775 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2009) (finding autism services
adequate).
129

20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B) (2006).

130

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II).

131

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(IV)(aa).

132

A case that flirts with this reading is Houston Independent School District v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d
341, 350 (5th Cir. 2000), which states that “it is not necessary for [a child] to improve in every area to
obtain an educational benefit . . . ,” and rejects the parents’ IDEA claim even though portions of the child’s
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provide some benefit to a child with a disability in all areas of need and with regard to all
categories of services that will address the child’s identified needs.
Cases in this category break down into those relating to general areas such as
transition and behavior, and specific areas such as reading-writing and speech-language.
IEPs must have plans to address transition for children sixteen and older, but the law does
not specify much more than that the plans have to address training, education,
employment, and, where appropriate, independent living skills.133 Courts, however, have
ruled that IEPs fail the test of providing appropriate education when they do not call for
specific services to facilitate the adjustment to post-secondary experience. Dracut School
Committee v. Bureau of Special Education Appeals found an IEP’s transition services to
be inadequate when they failed to address a student’s need for pragmatic language skills,
vocational skills, and skills for independent living, even though the child excelled in
mainstream high school courses and graduated in the top half of his class.134 The court
stressed that despite the student’s academic achievement, he lacked the communication
skills and other life skills to attend and participate effectively in college classes.135
Similarly, in Klein Independent School District v. Hovem, discussed at greater length
below, the court found a failure to provide appropriate education when a high school
child’s IEP lacked objective and measurable goals for transition to college and failed to
IEP, including an alphabetic phonics program, were not fully implemented. On closer examination,
however, it becomes clear that the opinion rests on the fact that compensatory services were offered to
make up for the implementation problems and relies on the principle that de minimis failures in IEP
implementation do not support a remedy when the child makes educational progress in the area the missing
services were designed to address. See id. at 349-50.
133

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII)(aa)-(bb) (2006).

134

737 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass. 2010).

135

Id. at 47, 52-53.
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identify needed services, despite the fact that the child passed all his classes and was on
track to graduate high school.136
As for behavior services, the IEP section of IDEA provides that “in the case of a
child whose behavior impedes the child’s learning or that of others, [the IEP team shall]
consider the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to
address that behavior.”137 Nothing more specific is laid out except in the student
discipline section of the statute, which applies only when a student is being suspended or
otherwise excluded from school,138 and it is possible to imagine an educational program
conferring some benefit on a student while still leaving important behavior deficits
unaddressed. Courts, however, have required a level of adequacy of services in this area
even for students otherwise receiving an educational benefit. For example, in R.K. v.
New York City Department of Education, the court held that failure to incorporate a
functional behavioral analysis and behavior intervention plan into an autistic child’s IEP
violated the appropriate education requirement when the child’s behavior, though not
atypical for a child with autism, impeded her learning.139 A New Jersey case required
behavior services to be delivered at home to curb a child’s self-stimulation and
aggression, and found parent training offered by the school district to be insufficient,
even though the child was already being given extensive applied behavior analysis
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745 F. Supp. 2d 700, 751 (S.D. Tex, 2010). See generally infra note __ (discussing case in
connection with reading and writing services).
137

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) (2006).

138

§ 1415(k)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
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No. 09-CV-4478 KAM, 2011 WL 1131492 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011) (magistrate judge
recommendation), adopted, 2011 WL 1131522 (E.D.N.Y. Mar 28, 2011).
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services at school.140 A.C. v. Board of Education found a failure to provide appropriate
education when the school district did not conduct a functional behavioral analysis of the
student whose poor attention, lack of focus, tangential speech, and fantasizing interfered
with his instruction, even though a one-on-one aide kept the child’s behavior in control at
school.141 The court noted that the presence of the aide interfered with the child’s
achievement of independent functioning, but it did not balance that detriment against any
of the other benefits of the program.142
Courts have also found a failure to provide appropriate education when an
otherwise beneficial program lacked particular needed services such as speech and
language or reading and writing interventions. In B.H. v. West Clermont Board of
Education, the court ruled that the school district denied appropriate education when it
failed to consider independent evaluations showing that the child needed speech services
and predetermined that the child did not need speech services, even though other services
were provided.143 The chief complaint in Klein Independent School District v. Hovem
was that the high schooler, although learning the content of his courses, remained at a 5.1
140

New Milford Board of Education v. C.R., No. 09-328 (JLL), 2010 WL 2571343 (D.N.J. June
22, 2010). The court relied in part on the Judge Alito’s gloss on Rowley. See id. at *5. See generally
supra note __ and accompanying text (describing Third Circuit interpretation of Rowley standard). Other
cases requiring specific behavioral services for students with autism, despite programs oriented towards
autistic behaviors, include: Escambia County Bd. of Educ. v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (S.D. Ala.
2005); Indiana Area Sch. Dist. v. H.H., No. Civ.A. 04-1696, 2005 WL 3970591 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2005).
141

No. 06 Civ. 4238(CLB), 2007 WL 1259145 (S.D.N.Y. April 27, 2007).

142

Id. at *5; see also Long v. Dist. of Columbia, No: 09-2130 (GK), 2011 WL 1061172 (D.D.C.
Mar. 23, 2011) (stressing IEP requirement to consider strategies to address behavior and noting
deterioration of child’s behavior in school); School Bd. v. Brown, No. 2:10CV41, 2010 WL 5587759 (E.D.
Va. Dec. 13, 2010) (finding violation of IDEA by failing to implement positive behavioral interventions
and supports, thus not providing any meaningful way for child to achieve educational benefit in response to
behavioral difficulties).
143

No. 1:10-CV-520, 2011 WL 1575591 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2011). The school also failed to
provide needed occupational therapy services, see id. at *10, and provided ineffective behavioral services,
see infra text accompanying notes ___.
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grade level in word identification and at second and third grade levels in various other
aspects of reading, even though he had a high overall reading comprehension score.144
He achieved his good grades in part by being allowed to present material orally,145 an
indication he was making educational progress in general, but the absence of services to
address his reading, writing, and other specific deficits constituted a denial of appropriate
education.146
Numerous cases that relate to the all-areas idea directly enforce the statutory
requirement that children must be evaluated in all areas of suspected disability;147 the
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745 F. Supp 2d 700, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2010).

145

See id. at 750.

146

Id. at 753; see also Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 56 v. Ms. W, No: 06-81-B-W, 2007 WL 922252
(D. Me. Mar. 27, 2007) (magistrate judge recommendation) (stating that school district denied child
appropriate education by failing to provide services to address his weakness in writing, though noting that
program addressed other problems), adopted, 2007 WL 1129378 (D. Me. Apr. 16, 2007).
147

E.g., N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling that school
district failed to fulfill procedural requirements to evaluate child in all areas of disability, depriving child of
appropriate education); J.G. v. Kiryas Joel Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 08 CIV. 6395-WGY, 2011 WL
1346845 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (requiring assistive technology evaluation for child with severe speech
and language deficits); D.B. v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., 708 F. Supp. 2d 564 (W.D. Va. 2010) (finding
failure to evaluate student for learning disability caused denial of appropriate education); Compton Unified
Sch. Dist. v. A.F., No. CV 09-1427 AHM (CWx), 2010 WL 1727674 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2010) (finding
failure to evaluate child for emotional disturbance, leading to denial of appropriate education); Suggs v.
District of Columbia, 679 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 IDELR 321 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2010) (denying school system’s
motion for summary judgment in case alleging that school system failed to provide needed evaluations);
W.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV F 08-0374 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 1605356 (E.D. Cal. June 8,
2009) (finding that school district improperly ignored evidence that writing was area of suspected disability
and inadequately assessed child in that area, depriving child of educational benefits), motion to stay denied,
2009 WL 2959849 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2009), judgment withdrawn, 2009 WL 5197215 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22,
2009); Blake C. v. Department of Educ., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Haw. 2009) (holding that school system
violated IDEA by failing to perform assistive technology evaluation); see Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ. v. B.H., No. 3:07cv189, 2008 WL 4394191 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 24, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss
action alleging prolonged failure to evaluate child with serious neurological disease for other health
impairments or speech-language and occupational therapy, failure to assess writing, and use of invalid
verbal comprehension and perceptual reasoning evaluation).
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evaluations may in turn be expected to lead to provision of adequate services in all areas
or a finding of denial of appropriate education if adequate services are not provided.148
(2) Peer-Reviewed Research. A 2004 amendment to IDEA provides that an IEP
must include “a statement of the special education and related services and
supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent
practicable, to be provided to the child, or on behalf of the child . . . .”149 By requiring
interventions that are supported by serious professional research, this provision has the
potential to improve the quality of special education services and, not coincidentally, to
mandate services that are not just reasonably calculated to confer some benefit but that
are actually demonstrated to work.150 The court in B.H. v. West Clermont Board of
Education relied on the state administrative code section incorporating this federal
148

See, e.g., Long v. District of Columbia, No. CIV.A. 09-2130 GK, 2011 WL 1061172 (D.D.C.
Mar. 23, 2011) (holding that defendant must afford child evaluation of functional behavior and develop
behavior intervention plan on evaluation’s analysis); Bd. of Educ. v. H.A., No. No. 2:09-cv-001318, 2011
WL 861163 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 9, 2011) (finding that failure to evaluate behavior and provide services
violated appropriate education obligation); E.S. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 742 F. Supp. 2d 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding program for school year inadequate for failing to account for progress reflected in
qualitative evaluations from past school year); District of Columbia v. Bryant-James, 675 F. Supp. 2d 115
(D.D.C. 2009) (holding that IEP was inadequate in failing to address evaluation’s determination that child
needed distraction-free environment); Heather D. v. Northampton Area Sch. Dist., 511 F. Supp 2d 549
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding failure to evaluate child for behavioral or psychiatric problems, leading to failure
to provide appropriate services).
149

Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 101, 118 Stat. 2708 (2004) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV)

(2006)).
150

See Perry A. Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Razed Rowley and Raised the Substantive Standard for “Free Appropriate Public Education”?, 28 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN L. JUDICIARY 397, 410-15 (2008) (discussing potential impact of peer-reviewedresearch provision); see also Jean B. Crockett & Mitchell L. Yell, Without Data All We Have Are
Assumptions: Revisiting the Meaning of a Free Appropriate Public Education , 37 J.L. & EDUC., 381, 388
(2008) (“The inclusion of this terminology may prove to be significant to future courts when interpreting
the FAPE mandate because the law directs IEP teams, when developing a student's IEP, to base the special
education services to be provided on reliable evidence that the program or service works. To comply with
this new requirement, therefore, special education teachers should use interventions that empirical research
has proven to be successful in teaching behavioral and academic skills to students with disabilities.”); Mark
C. Weber, Special Education from the (Damp) Ground Up: Children with Disabilities in a Charter SchoolDependent Educational System, 11 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 217, 232-33 (2010) (discussing peer-reviewedresearch provision in connection with improving educational outcomes for children in special education).
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statutory language151 to hold that the school district denied appropriate education by
using a behavior-intervention point system that was not shown to have a scientific basis,
was not understood by the child, and was inconsistently applied.152 In harmony with
other cases addressing behavioral services, the court stressed that the state review officer
misapplied the legal standard by demanding the parents to make a showing of negative
impact on the child’s educational opportunities from the improper behavior techniques,
stating flatly that “IDEA requires that the District address the student’s behavior if it
impedes their learning or that of others.”153 There are parallel holdings elsewhere. In
Waukee Community School District v. Douglas L., the court, without directly relying on
the “peer-reviewed research” language, found that the public education offered a child
who had a pervasive developmental disorder failed provide appropriate education when
the methods used to control the student’s behavior—restraint-type interventions and the
extensive use of time-outs—reinforced the behavior and were contrary to methods
supported by professional research.154 Thus the school district violated the appropriate
education requirement.155
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OHIO ADMIN CODE 3301-51-07(H)(1)(e) (2011) (current codification).
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No. 1:10-CV-520, 2011 WL 1575591 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2011).
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Id. at *12.
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51 IDELR 15 (S.D. Iowa 2008).
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Id. at p. 88; see also D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 2010) (not relying on
peer-reviewed-research provision, but holding that to confer meaningful educational benefit, IEP needed to
incorporate specific remedial techniques and provisions for accommodations supported by professional
evaluators, rather than general recommendation to use multi-sensory approach). The decisions on this topic
are not uniform. In another case, a court held that the peer-reviewed-research provision does not in and of
itself raise the statutory standard for what constitutes appropriate education, and stated that failure of a
school district to provide services based on peer-reviewed research did not automatically constitute a denial
of appropriate education. Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26745 (E.D. Cal.
2008), aff’d, 319 F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
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(3) Other IEP Requirements. Although Congress has not altered the statutory
definition of appropriate education in the wake of Rowley, it has placed an increasing
number of statutory obligations on IEP teams and added to the mandatory content of the
IEP. Examples include the behavioral services and peer-reviewed research provisions
discussed above.156 In upholding these IEP mandates, courts have rejected IEPs that
omitted parent training,157 lacked specific plans to facilitate a child’s transition from a
private school setting to public school and failed to specify adequate training for a child’s
teachers,158 and neglected to include goals in connection with a child’s needs concerning
auditory processing disorder and anxiety and omitted occupational therapy services.159
The enhanced attention to what services and goals are in the IEP fits well with the
tendency of courts to be ever more demanding of the IEPs’ educational goals themselves,
finding IEPs not to provide appropriate education when the goals listed are too vague or
insufficiently measurable.160
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See supra text accompanying notes __ (behavior), ___ (peer-reviewed research).
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See R.K. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-4478 KAM, 2011 WL 1131492 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 21, 2011) (requiring inclusion of parent training and counseling in IEP; further requiring provision of
adequate speech and language therapy services), adopted, 2011 WL 1131522, 56 IDELR 212 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar 28, 2011).
158

Reg’l Sch. Dist. No. 9 Bd. of Educ. v. Mr. P., No. 3:06 CV 01278 (CFD), 2009 WL 103376 (D.
Conn. January 12, 2009) (finding program not to be appropriate due to absence of plan for transition from
private to public school, and failure to require adequate training for child’s teachers and family members,
and assessment of child’s assistive technology needs).
159

C.B. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097-98 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see
also Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. Brown, No. 2:10CV41, 2010 WL 5587759, 56 IDELR 8 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13,
2010) (finding IDEA child-find obligation violation in case of child whose IEP lacked any behavioral goals
or objectives).
160

See, e.g., Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09-CV-243, 2011 WL 1230813
(W.D. Mich., March 31, 2011) (ruling that IEP lacked adequate information about present level of
functioning and ascertainable criteria for measuring child’s progress); M.H. v. N.Y. Department of
Education, 712 F. Supp 2d 125, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (rejecting IEP with short term objectives lacking
evaluative procedures and containing goals not tailored to child’s unique needs). Of course, in a way this
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CONCLUSION
It must be emphasized that the cases just described are not efforts by lower courts
to overrule Rowley, sub silentio or otherwise; the decisions rest on other bases in the law
and rely on plausible distinctions from that case. Inevitably, however, these and other
well reasoned case results will put pressure on Rowley’s some-benefit rule. It is
premature to label Rowley obsolete, but a common-law approach to appropriate
education—one that eventually leads to proportional maximization or one that does not—
may be glimmering on the horizon.

dovetails with Rowley itself, which emphasized the importance of the IEP and the procedural safeguards
around its creation. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203, 205-06 & n.27.
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